Budgetary Separation of Powers in the American States and the Tax Level: A Regression Discontinuity Design by Leandro M. De Magalhães & Lucas Ferrero
     
                                                
 


















   
Centre for Market and Public Organisation  
Bristol Institute of Public Affairs  
University of Bristol  
2 Priory Road 
Bristol BS8 1TX 
http://www.bristol.ac.uk/cmpo/ 
 
Tel: (0117) 33 10799 




The Centre for Market and Public Organisation (CMPO) is a leading research 
centre, combining expertise in economics, geography and law. Our objective is to 
study the intersection between the public and private sectors of the economy, and 
in particular to understand the right way to organise and deliver public services. 
The Centre aims to develop research, contribute to the public debate and inform 
policy-making.  
 
CMPO, now an ESRC Research Centre was established in 1998 with two large 
grants from The Leverhulme Trust. In 2004 we were awarded ESRC Research 






Budgetary Separation of Powers in the American 
States and the Tax Level:  
A Regression Discontinuity Design 
Leandro M. De Magalhães and Lucas Ferrero 
October 2009 
 
Working Paper No. 09/225  
 
CMPO Working Paper Series No. 09/225 
 
 
Budgetary Separation of Powers in the 
American States and the Tax Level:  
A Regression Discontinuity Design    
 
 







1 University of Bristol 








Should the Federal government and the remaining American states adopt the line item veto? What are 
its effects? We use regression discontinuity design to claim that in states with the line item veto, 
divided government has a causal negative effect on the tax level. By investigating a panel of 38 
American states from 1960 to 2006, we estimate a significant discontinuous increase of 13% in the tax 
level as the party affiliated with the Governor in the state Legislature switches from being the minority 
party to being the majority. In the nine states that have block veto, we find no significant discontinuity 
in the tax level. We also find little evidence to suggest that the partisan identity of the majority party in 
the Legislature has a causal effect on the state tax level. 
 
Keywords: Separation of powers, line item veto, tax level, regression discontinuity, nonparametric 
 
JEL Classification: H00, H11, H20, H30, H71 
www.bristol.ac.uk/cmpo/publications/papers/2009/wp225.pdf Electronic version:   
Acknowledgements   
We thank Guido Tabellini for his guidance and encouragement throughout; Eliana LaFerrara, Carlo 
Favero, Antonio Merlo and Pablo Spiller for their detailed comments and suggestions; and the faculties 
and students of Bocconi University, the University of Bristol and the University of Pennsylvania, in 
particular Petra Todd. 
 
Address for Correspondence 
CMPO, Bristol Institute of Public Affairs 
University of Bristol 







CMPO is jointly funded by the Leverhulme Trust and the ESRC Budgetary Separation of Powers in the American States and
the Tax Level: A Regression Discontinuity Design¤










Should the Federal government and the remaining American states adopt the line item
veto? What are its e®ects? We use regression discontinuity design to claim that in states
with the line item veto, divided government has a causal negative e®ect on the tax level.
By investigating a panel of 38 American states from 1960 to 2006, we estimate a signi¯cant
discontinuous increase of 13% in the tax level as the party a±liated with the Governor in
the state Legislature switches from being the minority party to being the majority. In the
nine states that have block veto, we ¯nd no signi¯cant discontinuity in the tax level. We
also ¯nd little evidence to suggest that the partisan identity of the majority party in the
Legislature has a causal e®ect on the state tax level.
JEL: H00, H11, H20, H30, H71.
Key words: Separation of powers, line item veto, tax level, regression discontinuity, nonparamet-
ric.
1 Introduction
In the American states, the Legislature has the power to write and amend the state budget and
set state-speci¯c taxes. In most states, the Governor may veto particular lines, items, words,
or even trim values in the budget approved by the state Legislature. This sort of veto power
di®ers from the veto power that the American President has over a budget approved by Congress.
The President only has the power to veto the federal budget as a block. In political discourse,
the line item veto is often cited as an institutional change that could be used to help curtail
pork-barrel and log-rolling at the federal level1. Theoretical literature to date has provided no
clear predictions regarding the e®ects of the line item veto on the tax level, and the empirical
literature has provided con°icting results.
In order to understand the role of veto power, we also have to look at politics and partisanship.
The political in°uence of a party over policy increases with the number of seats it holds in the
¤We thank Guido Tabellini for his guidance and encouragement throughout; Eliana LaFerrara, Carlo Favero,
Antonio Merlo, and Pablo Spiller for their detailed comments and suggestions; and the faculties and students of
Bocconi University, the University of Bristol, and the University of Pennsylvania, in particular Petra Todd.
1 See Abney and Lauth (1985) for a survey that asks legislative budget o±cers about their perceptions on the
line item veto and how frequently it is used. See Urofsky and Finkelman (2002) for an account on how the line
item veto came close to being adopted under the Clinton administration.
1Legislature. There is a discontinuous change in its in°uence, however, when it surpasses the 50%
threshold. With such a majority, the party acquires the power to both propose a budget, and
to set the level of taxation. This discontinuous change allows us to use regression-discontinuity
design to try and identify a causal link between political control and the state tax level. For the
purposes of this paper we de¯ne the tax level as the sum of state income, corporate, and sales
taxes divided by state income.
Our forcing variable is Governor's strength. This we de¯ne as the percentage of seats in the
state House of Representatives that belong to the same party as the sitting Governor, whether
they be Democrat or Republican2. Above the 50% threshold, the interests of the Governor and
of the Legislature majority are more likely to be aligned. In this case, we expect there to be
less use for any veto power. Below this threshold, however, the government is divided, and their
interests are less likely to be aligned. In this case therefore, we expect the power of veto to be
more relevant.
The main result of this paper is that in the 38 states with the line item veto, we estimate a
signi¯cant discontinuous increase of 13% in the tax level at the point at which Governor's strength
crosses the 50% cuto®. Under the identifying assumptions of our regression discontinuity design,
we estimate a causal e®ect: that the switch from a divided to an aligned government causes
the tax level to increase. To check the validity of our regression discontinuity design, we look
for evidence of discontinuities within the other covariates at the same 50% cuto® point. With
the exception of the lagged tax level, which we discuss in detail in Section 6.7, we ¯nd that no
covariate shows a signi¯cant discontinuity.
We also ¯nd two other interesting and complementary results. Firstly, in the nine states with
a block veto, we ¯nd no signi¯cant discontinuity in the tax level. But this result is less robust
than our main result. This is because the sample is small. Secondly, we ¯nd no discontinuous
jump in the tax level as the control of the Legislature switches from Democrat to Republican.
This suggests that a model showing budgetary separation of powers together with the degree
of alignment between Governor and Legislature is more relevant to explain the tax level than a
model that attributes di®erent preferences over taxation to Republicans and Democrats.
In Section 2, we discuss related literature on the line item veto and on the role of the separation
of powers on the tax level. In Section 3, we describe the model we developed to help interpret
our data. In Section 4, we describe the data. In Section 5, we discuss the regression discontinuity
design and the estimation procedures. In Section 6, we present our results.
2 Related literature
There are two papers in particular that relate to our work. Holtz-Eakin (1988) uses a panel
from 1966 to 1983, running a ¯xed e®ect model, in which a dummy for the time invariant line
item veto is interacted with a dummy for divided government and with other variables indicating
the partisan identity of the Governor. In contrast to our results, he ¯nds that this interaction
dummy is positively correlated with the overall tax revenue, both for Democratic and Republican
Governors. The second and, to our knowledge, most recent empirical work on the e®ects of the
line item veto is that of Besley and Case (2003). They have a longer data set, from 1960 to
1998, and interact a dummy for line item veto with a dummy for divided government. In their
estimates, a divided government in a state with line item veto is negatively correlated with tax
revenues per capita. This result is in line with ours. Their estimations, however, are based on a
2The Senate plays an important role in writing and approving the budget. For the purposes of our regression
discontinuity design, we have decided to focus on the states' Houses. In Section 6.3.3, we show that the political
control of the Senate does not a®ect our result.
2linear panel strategy with ¯xed e®ects3.
The main contribution of our paper to this literature is to use a regression discontinuity
design to try and identify a causal relation between divided government and a lower tax level in
the American states with line item veto.
To some extent, we address Acemoglu (2005)'s critique of the comparative political economy
literature as a whole. He argues that it is hard to identify the e®ect of a speci¯c institution,
because institutions tend to come in bundles. For example, Persson and Tabellini (2004) use
the fraction of the population that speaks English in a country as an instrumental variable
to estimate the e®ect that Presidentialism (separation of powers) versus Parliamentarism (no
separation of powers) has on the size of government4. Potentially, the fraction of English speakers
could be a good instrument for two reasons: ¯rstly, one does not expect the fraction of English
speakers to be directly related to the size of government; and secondly, the fraction of English
speakers is positively correlated to the presence of a Parliamentary system. However, the fraction
of English speakers is also correlated with many other institutional features such as, strong
¯nancial markets, good quality institutions, a majoritarian system, as well as other unobservable
features, that tend to come in a bundle. Acemoglu (2005) notes that ¯nding a correlation between
Presidentialism (instrumented by the fraction of English speakers) and a smaller government
size may be due to these other institutions as well and, therefore, cannot be attributed to the
separation of powers alone. By focusing on the American states, we are able to control for
common institutions across states. In addition, our regression discontinuity design allows us to
test whether the incidence of a particular institutional feature is playing a role in our result.
In this paper, we also contribute to the theoretical literature that has looked at the line item
veto, such as Carter and Schap (1990) and Holtz-Eakin (1988). Both papers propose models
with preferences represented in either a one or a two-dimensional space. These preferences relate
both to types of expenditure, and to the tax level in general. In addition, both papers model the
line item veto as a tool to bring the proposed budget closer to the Governor's preferred point
within this space. Since the Governor's preferred point may be anywhere, bringing the budget
closer to it does not necessarily imply that the overall level of taxation is lower. Neither model
has a clear testable prediction on the tax level.
We propose a simple model with a clear prediction. We look at the budgetary separation of
powers in the American states. Our de¯nition of the `budgetary' separation of powers is similar
to Persson et al. (2000)'s description of the `separation of powers'. In their model, Persson et al.
(2000) de¯ne separation of powers as being one agent having the power to choose the tax level,
and another having the power to allocate resources. If these powers are combined into one
agent, or if two agents holding these powers act in response to a single constituency, there is no
separation of powers. Persson et al. (2000) show that taxes are lower in a regime with such a
separation of powers, because the `tax setter' is not the residual claimant of a tax increase. In
their interpretation, this sort of separation of powers is associated with a Presidential regime. We
consider this interpretation to be invalid for the American states. This is because the budgetary
separation of powers in the American states is di®erent: both the power to set the tax level
and to write the budget lie within the Legislature5. Whereas the Governor has veto power over
the budget. In this paper, we investigate how the presence of the line item veto may prevent
the state Legislature from being the full residual claimant of a tax increase. Thus creating the
3Abrams and Dougan (1986) and Alm and Evers (1991) use cross-sectional data and ¯nd con°icting results.
Bohn and Inman (1996) work with a panel of 47 states from 1970 to 1991. Since the line item veto is time
invariant in their sample, they regress the ¯xed e®ects on the institutional features. They ¯nd that states with
line item veto and no-de¯cit rules have lower de¯cits.
4 The size of government is de¯ned as central government expenditures divided by GDP.
5In some states, although the Governor's o±ce may write the ¯rst budget proposal, once it reaches the
Legislature it can be changed and amended at will.
3conditions for the budgetary separation of powers to have an e®ect on ¯scal policy.
In the model described in Section 3, we look at the degree of alignment between Legislature
and Governor. Grossman and Helpman (2008) propose a theoretical model that explores the
role of di®erent degrees of alignment between legislative and executive on the budget process6.
They focus on how di®erent degrees of alignment between the executive and the legislative can
produce two types of budget: those with earmarked items, and those which give discretion
to the executive. Grossman and Helpman (2008) show that the legislative tend to give more
discretion to the executive when both the legislative and the executive have a large overlap in
their constituencies. When the overlap is small (such as in a divided government), the legislative
allows considerably less discretion to the executive. In their model, earmarks are the only way
that the legislative is able to send transfers to their constituency in a divided government. They
do not consider the role of veto power. As an alternative approach, we explore how di®erent
levels of alignment interact with veto power, and the e®ect that this interaction has on the tax
level.
3 Model
In order to create a testable prediction of the e®ects of the line item veto on the tax level,
we developed a model of the budgetary process in the American states as a noncooperative
bargaining game7. In this model, one agent, the Legislature, proposes a budget composed of a
tax level and of a proposal for the allocation of tax revenues. The other agent, the Governor,
has veto power over the budget. Once the budgetary process is modeled as a noncooperative
bargaining game, the di®erences between the line item veto and the block veto become clear. In
a state with block veto the budget is a take-it-or-leave-it o®er, whereas in a state with line item
veto, there is a ¯nal stage in which the budget can be trimmed. The line item veto will only be
e®ective when the Legislature's majority and the Governor are not from the same party (divided
government). When their interests are aligned, it is as if there were no veto power. Furthermore,
the high cost implied by the outside option triggered by the block veto means it does not play a
role, regardless of whether the government be aligned or divided.
There are two parties in our model: Democrats and Republicans. We focus our attention on
cases where these parties have an equal number of supporters, i.e. 50% within the population.
In this instance, election results would have to be decided by random events, such as small
variations in turnout or the °ipping of a coin. When elections produce an aligned government,
both the Governor and the Legislature answer to the same party, and the second party is not
required to pass the budget. For example, when the Republicans control both the Legislature
and the Governorship, the Democratic half of the population is excluded from power. If, on the
other hand, the government is divided, each agent (Governor and Legislature) is controlled by a
di®erent party8.
We assume that the Governor and the majority in the Legislature maximize the utility of
their own party supporters. Each group of supporters i is populated by a mass of size one of
6Throughout the American states, the legislative is called the Legislature and is composed of the state House
and the state Senate. The executive is the Governor's o±ce.
7Kousser and Phillips (2009) model the state budgetary process as an noncooperative bargaining game. They
are not looking into the role of either line item veto or divided government. Instead, they focus on the impact
that the professionalisation of state Legislatures have on the discount factor, and therefore how the bargaining
outcome may change as a result.
8This assumption of either having a fully aligned or a fully divided government simpli¯es the model, but is
not necessary. All we need to generate the prediction of a discontinuous change in the tax level is a discontinuous
change in the degree of alignment between parties, whenever governments switch from divided to aligned.
4identical agents with utility given by:
Ui = y ¡ ¿ + fi + H(g);
where fi, i 2 fd;rg is a group-speci¯c monetary transfer; and H (¢) is a continuous, twice
di®erentiable, increasing, strictly concave function, which implies a decreasing marginal net
bene¯t of the public good, g. We assume that Hg(0) > 1,9 so that the ¯rst unit of taxation
preferably goes to the public good, and that H¡1
g (1
2) < 2, so that the optimal level of g is an
interior solution. There are no spending externalities across groups. We normalize total taxable
income in each group, y ´ 1. A lump sum tax, ¿ · 1, is the same for each group. The total






The timing of the model is as follows. The Legislature makes a budget proposal q =
(¿;fd;fr;g). In the next move, the Governor may veto this proposal. If the Governor has
line item veto power, they can cut either fd, fr, or g, and taxes are lowered to keep the budget
balanced. If the Governor has block veto power, the veto implies that an outside option is imple-
mented. We assume this outside option is too costly for the block veto to be a credible threat.
For simplicity, we let the outside option yield a utility of 0, meaning taxes have been paid, ¿ = 1,
but no public good or transfers are provided, g = f = 012.
A word is needed to justify our assumption of a prohibitively costly block veto. Each state
government deals di®erently with stalemates in the budget process. Two of the states with block
veto (NC and NH) allow for continuing temporary resolutions. Three others (NV, VI, and WA)
have no speci¯c procedures to deal with this eventuality, therefore meaning that a government
shut-down is possible. During a government shutdown, government employees stay at home and
all government-provided services stop, except for those within essential areas 13. In the remaining
states (IN, IO, ME, and VT), a government shut-down is determined by state law. We believe
that this assumption for the outside option captures the di®erence between line item veto and
block veto appropriately, especially with regards to their role in a noncooperative bargaining
game.
In our model, we look at four di®erent setups: 1) aligned government in a state with block
veto; 2) aligned government in a state with line item veto; 3) divided government in a state with
block veto; and 4) divided government in a state with line item veto.
Setups 1 and 2. These two setups can be described as one. When the government is aligned
both the Legislature and the Governor maximize the utility of the same group of supporters, and
hence the type of veto does not play a role. Without loss of generality, let this group be Group
r:
Max¿;g;fr;fd 1 ¡ ¿ + fr + H(g)
s:t: 2¿ ¸ fr + fd + g:
9Hg(:) is the ¯rst derivative of the function H(:) with respect to g.
10This setup allows for taxation of 100% of GDP. It is a simpli¯cation and we interpret ¿ = 1 to be the highest
politically feasible tax level.
11We do not allow for de¯cits. Our model and empirical strategy take a static approach. In practice, all states
except Vermont have some form of balanced budget requirement and no-carry-over de¯cit rules.
12The less stringent assumption is that the outside option has to be such that H(gBV ) > U(outside option),
where gBV is derived below.
13 See NCSL document `Procedures When the Appropriations At is Not Passed by the Beginning of the Fiscal
Year': http://ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=12616. For a detailed description of federal government shutdowns see
Meyers (1997).
5Note that fd ¸ 0 is a cost to Group r and therefore in equilibrium fd = 0.
Also note that the marginal bene¯t of taxation is 1, whilst its marginal cost is 1
2. Taxation
is shared between the two groups: d and r, but only Group r bene¯ts in direct transfers. This
insures that it is optimal to set taxes at the maximum, because once the marginal bene¯t of the
public good decreases to the point to which it equals the marginal bene¯t of the direct transfer,
1, Group r wants as much in transfers as possible. The solution to the bargaining problem gives
us: ¿ = 1, gBV ´ H¡1
g (1), fd = 0, fr = 2 ¡ gBV > 0.
Setup 3. In a state with block veto and a divided government, let Group r support the Legisla-
ture, and Group d the Governor. We solve this bargaining problem through backward induction.
The outside option implies that any policy proposed by the Legislature giving a utility higher
than 0 to group d, will be accepted by the Governor. Therefore, the solution to this problem
is the same as the solution to the unconstrained maximization problem exempli¯ed in Setups 1
and 2. It yields utility Ud = H(gBV ) to the supporters of the Governor. Taxes are set at ¿ = 1
and the supporters of the Legislature receive a transfer of fr = 2¡gBV > 0 on top of the public
good. Because of the sequential nature of the bargaining and the severity of the outside option,
i.e. government shutdown, our model predicts that in the states which have block veto, the tax
level will be the same in both divided and aligned governments.
Setup 4. In a state with line item veto and a divided government, let Group r support the
Legislature, and Group d the Governor. We solve this bargaining problem through backward
induction. In the last stage of the game, any positive transfer to Group r (fr ¸ 0) will be cut
to zero by the Governor to fr = 0 . The Legislature takes that into account when proposing a
budget, and solves the following problem to maximize the utility of its supporters, Group r:
Max¿;g;fr;fd 1 ¡ ¿ + H(g)
s:t: 2¿ ¸ fd + g:
The solution to this problem yields fr = fd = 0, gLIV ´ H¡1
g (1




Our model has the clear prediction that in states with line item veto, we expect the tax level
to be lower when the government is divided, than when the government is aligned. In states
with block veto, we expect no di®erence in the tax level.
To summarize, in this section we have de¯ned the formal `budgetary separation of powers' as
the Legislature having power over both the tax level and the allocation of tax revenues, whilst
the Governor only has the veto power over the budget. We have identi¯ed two necessary but not
su±cient conditions for budgetary separation of powers to a®ect ¯scal policy. These are ¯rstly,
that the Governor must have access to a particular type of veto power, i.e. the line item veto; and
secondly, that the interests of the Governor and of the Legislature majority be not fully aligned.
If both these conditions are satis¯ed, then the Legislature is not the full residual claimant of a
tax increase and, therefore, ¯nds it optimal to keep the tax level below the maximum14.
4 Data
In this section, we discuss the data we use to test the prediction produced by our model.
We analyze a sample of 47 American states from 1960 to 2006. Most of our political, ¯scal,
and population variables are the same as those used by Besley and Case (2003)15. We have
updated Besley and Case (2003)'s sample from 1960 to 1998 with data from 1999 to 2006. Some
14It is important to stress here that this model is based on the institutions of the American states, and on the
political support for both parties being evenly divided within these states .
15We are thankful to Timothy Besley and Anne Case for making their data sets available to us.
6institutional and procedural variables have been collected from the National Association of State
Budget O±ces (NASBO) and the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL). There is not
enough data to include Alaska and Hawaii. Nebraska is excluded for being the only unicameral
state and for having a non-partisan Legislature. We exclude 21 observations with independent
Governors. We exclude Minnesota because until 1972 it had a non-partisan Legislature and
from 1982 to 2002, its Governors were not those that had been chosen by the two major parties
during the primaries16. We also exclude Arkansas, California, and Rhode Island, because they all
require a two-third majority in order to pass the budget, which implies a di®erent cuto® point of
Governor's strength= 66:6%, and there is not enough data to reliably reproduce our estimation
procedure at this cuto®.
In our sample, the average tax level of the American states is around 5% of GDP. As we
mentioned in Section 1, the tax level is de¯ned as the sum of state income, sales, and corporate
taxes divided by state GDP. We also have data on state expenditures, which averages at 10%
of GDP. Much of this expenditure is determined by Federal transfers and local programs, which
are neither under the control of the state Legislature nor the Governor. Since our model is silent
on the role the Federal and local governments have on ¯scal policy17, we decided to focus solely
on tax revenue.
We also show results with an alternative measure for the tax level: state taxes per capita.
Taxes per capita seem to be more time dependent than tax revenues over GDP, however. The
average taxes per capita across states in 1982-dollars during the 1960's is $354. This jumps to
$560 in the 1970's, $669 in the 1980's, $834 in the 1990's, and $961 in the 2000's. Taxes over
GDP are much more stable across the same period: 4.5% in the 1960's, 5.7% in the 1970's, 5.8%
in the 1980's, 5.9% in the 1990's, and 5.9% in the 2000's. We prefer to use taxes over GDP as our
preferred dependent variable because it is potentially less vulnerable to outliers from the 1960's
and to comparisons of estimates from the observations of di®erent decades. Even when using
taxes over GDP, however, the 1960's is an outlier decade. Because of this, one of our robustness
checks is to estimate our results excluding this period.
An alternative measure to tax revenues over GDP and to taxes per capita would be to look
at the tax rates themselves. We do not do this for two reasons. Firstly, we have not found the
necessary data18. Secondly, there are ways in which to increase the tax level without changing
the tax rate, such as not cutting taxes when the economy is growing (since taxes are progressive),
or increasing prevention e®orts against tax evasion.
Throughout our sample thirty-four states have line item veto; ¯ve states have block veto:
Indiana, North Carolina, New Hampshire, Nevada, and Vermont; and four states adopted the
line item veto during our sample period: Iowa, Washington, Virginia, and Maine19. We divide
our data into two sub-samples according to the type of veto power. The four states which change
status appear on the block veto sub-sample up to their adoption of the line item veto, and then
16We discuss Minnesota in detail in the Appendix, Section A.2.1.
17We are assuming away how tax rates are set in federal units that take central government tax policy into
account. For a discussion, see Klor (2005). We are also assuming away how the partisan alignment between
states and the federal government may a®ect Federal transfer. For an empirical discussion on Spanish data see,
Sol¶ e-Oll¶ ea and Sorribas-Navarro (2008).
18We do have data for some states on when income and corporate taxes were adopted. In our sample, seven
states with line item veto adopted either income or both income and corporate taxes: Connecticut (1970), Florida
(1972), Illinois (1970), Michigan (1968), New Jersey (1962), Ohio (1972), and Pennsylvania (1971). All states,
except Ohio, created new taxes under an aligned government. Four states with block veto adopted corporate or
income taxes during this period, Indiana (1964), Maine (1970), Rhode Island (1970), and New Hampshire (1971).
Two of these states had aligned governments, and two were divided. South Dakota, Texas, Washington, and
Wyoming do not have a state income tax throughout the sample, but their exclusion does not change our results.
19Maine adopted the line item veto in 1995, and the remaining three states adopted it in 1969. For a discussion
on why states adopt the line item veto, see de Figueiredo Jr. (2002).
7they appear on the line item veto sub-sample.
We have additional data on the following variables: state population, income, and unemploy-
ment rate; the average state property tax, which is not decided by the Legislature; the political
identity of the Governor; the partisan identity of the majority in the state Senate; whether or
not the election was a midterm election; and election turnout. We also have data on whether the
state has other institutional features that may a®ect the tax level: supermajority requirements
for a tax increase, and tax and expenditure limitations. In Section 6, we follow standard practice
and check these covariates for signi¯cant discontinuities around Governor's strength=50%. Any
discontinuity in these covariates could be an indication that our regression discontinuity design
is not valid.
5 Regression discontinuity design
5.1 Design
Regression discontinuity is a quasi-experimental design. Its de¯ning characteristic is that the
probability of receiving treatment changes discontinuously as a function of one or more underlying
variables20. The treatment, call it t, is known to depend in a deterministic way on an observable
variable, g, known as the forcing variable, t = f (g), where g takes on a continuum of values. But
there exists a known point g0 where the function f (g) is discontinuous. 21 The main identifying
assumption of the design is that the relation between other covariates and g must be continuous
around g0. If that is the case, the only variable that is di®erent near both sides of the cuto® is
the treatment status. As a result, the discontinuity in t is identi¯ed as being caused only by the
changes in treatment status. One main caveat of the design is that it can only claim to identify
a causal relation locally, i.e. at the cuto®.
In this paper, the forcing variable is Governor's strength, and the dependent variable is the
state tax level. If the forcing variable is below 50%, the observation receives treatment. The
treatment is `divided government'. At each period, an observation is either assigned the treatment
or not. For the observations in which the election for the state House delivered a slim majority,
we argue that the assignment of treatment was as good as random. Furthermore, we administer
treatment to two groups of states with di®erent characteristics. In the states with line item veto,
we expect the treatment to have an e®ect. In the states with block veto, we expect the treatment
to have no e®ect.
There are limitations to this interpretation of our data. Firstly, whether a state has the line
item veto or block veto is mostly time invariant. We observe only four changes in our data set
and the choice to adopt one type of veto over another is endogenous and could be correlated
with other variables that we do not observe. Consequently our results concerning the e®ect of
divided government on the tax level within states that have the line item veto are stronger than
the results concerning the comparison between the two sets of states.
Secondly, we are applying a method originally designed for micro data, usually individual-level
data, to a macro data set, in which our observations are of states in a speci¯c year. We follow
Holtz-Eakin (1988) and Besley and Case (2003) and take a static approach. We use regression
discontinuity design to infer a causal relation between divided government and the tax level.
20For a detailed review of the regression discontinuity in Economics, see Lee and Lemieux (2009).
21More formally, the limits t+ ´ limg!g+
0
E[tjg] and t¡ ´ limg!g¡
0
E[tjg] exist and t+ 6= t¡. It is also
assumed that the density of g is positive in the neighborhood of g0: There are two types of discontinuity design,
fuzzy and sharp designs. In the sharp design, treatment is known to depend in a deterministic way on some
observed variables. Whereas in the fuzzy design, there are also unmeasured factors that a®ect selection into
treatment. Our case ¯ts the sharp design.
8We consider this is an important ¯rst step, but ultimately we think that the dynamic nature of
variables such as the tax level and income should also be taken into account. The most we do
in this paper is to allow for serially correlated errors of a given state over time; we always show
standard errors robust to clustering by state. We consider the main challenge to the validity of
our design to be that we ¯nd a signi¯cant discontinuity for our lagged dependent variable. We
discuss this result in more detail in Section 6.7.
Thirdly, an important assumption for our argument that divided government is assigned
randomly at the cuto® is that some state districts must have had a close election. It could be the
case that even though the number of seats a party hold in the Legisalture is very close to 50%,
all the individual state districts were won by a landslide majority. This assumption becomes
less stringent when we look at the states' House of Representatives than when we look at the
states' Senates. In our sample, state Senates have an average of 40 seats and have staggered
elections, in which half the seats are contested at each biennial election. On average, a state's
House has 110 seats and these are simultaneously contested every two years. It is easier for
our assumption to be satis¯ed in elections for the House than for the Senate. For this reason,
we focus our regression discontinuity design on the state House. We treat the political control
of the state Senate as another covariate, despite the fact that, in actuality, the House and the
Senate have similar powers over the budget. Speci¯cally, we show that the likelihood of the state
Senate being aligned with the Governor is the same on both sides of the cuto® and, therefore,
the alignment of the Senate does not drive our results.
Finally, another key assumption we need to make is that, particularly in matters of budgets,
representatives will vote within party lines. Political scientists tend to agree that parties in°uence
the policy making process. They disagree on the mechanisms, strength, and domain of this
in°uence22. An example of this can be seen in Wright and Scha®ner (2002), who compare the
unicameral non-partisan Nebraska legislature with the Kansas Senate. They claim that these two
chambers are comparable in almost all aspects, with the exception of Nebraska being o±cially run
as non-partisan. Wright and Scha®ner (2002) use roll-call data from 1996 to 1998 to determine
the ideological location of each representative in a spatial voting model. They also ¯nd that
although the main dimension, usually identi¯ed with a liberal-conservative line, does well in
predicting how the partisan senators in Kansas will vote, it does not help to predict how the non-
partisan members of the Nebraska legislature will vote. Wright and Scha®ner (2002) conclude
that this is an indication of the in°uence of parties on representatives' behavior. Similarly,
Aldrich and Battista (2002) look at roll-call data and spatial analysis in order to measure the
polarization of di®erent state legislatures. They ¯nd a strong positive relationship between slim
majorities and the more polarized Legislatures. Aldrich and Battista (2002) ¯nding is important
for the purposes of this paper, as our assumption that representatives vote according to party
line has to hold around the 50% cuto® point in particular.
5.2 Estimation methods
With the above mentioned caveats in mind, we implement the regression discontinuity design
methods following Lee and Lemieux (2009) and Imbems and Lemieux (2008). In this section we
discuss the estimation methods used, and we present our main results in Section 6.
In order to estimate the discontinuity at the cuto® in practise, we estimate two functions: one
with observations to the left, and one with observations to the right. The precision of the estimate
depends on how much °exibility we allow the functional form to have. One option is to impose a
parametric structure; we use a di®erent quartic polynomial for each side of the discontinuity23.
22For a review of the role of parties in Congress, see Smith (2007).
23We have experimented with other polynomial degrees and found similar results to our main speci¯cation when
9The advantage of this method is that estimating the discontinuity and calculating the standard
errors is straightforward. One of our main concerns is that our results are sensitive to the
polynomial degree and that the use of this method, as opposed to a nonparametric estimate,
uses data points too far from the 50% cuto® point. In all Figures in this paper, the solid line
indicates the parametrically estimated functions.
An alternative to the above method is to use a nonparametric approach. This does not
impose any constraints on the functional form. We follow the standard nonparametric approach
and use local linear regression with a triangular kernel24. The local linear regression method, as
argued in Hahn et al. (2001), fairs relatively better at the boundaries than other methods and,
therefore, is the most appropriate method to use with regression discontinuity design. A local
linear regression estimates a regression function at a particular point by only using data within
a bandwidth surrounding this point. The Kernel function gives more weight to the data that is
closest to the point being estimated.
Nonparametric results are sensitive to bandwidth choice. Imbens and Kalyararaman (2009)
propose a method to calculate an optimal bandwidth speci¯cally for regression discontinuity
design. Their method yields a bandwidth of 15 when applied to the tax level and Governor's
strength. Because most of the variability in this data seems to be away from the discontinuity, we
repeat the procedure on data within the medians of samples to the left (Governor's strength=
38%), and to the right (Governor's strength= 65%) of the 50% cuto®. The optimal bandwidth
for the sub-sample between the two medians is 7.25 We present results for those two bandwidths
throughout this paper. If the optimal bandwidth for a particular variable is other than 7 or
15, then we present the results for this third bandwidth as well. Graphically, we present the
estimated function by a local linear regression with bandwidth 7. At each point, the predicted
value is represented by £. We present the graphic result of the smaller bandwidth, because we
consider it a more adequate contrast to the parametric estimate, which uses the whole sample.
In addition, we also present local averages in intervals of width 0:5. This can be seen in
Figure 1, where the local average of a point Governor strength's= go is measured using the
average tax level in the intervals (go ¡ 0:25;go + 0:25]. These intervals are constructed so that
the interval immediately to the left of the 50% cuto® is (49:5;50]. This interval contains 19
observations with an average tax level of 4.5% of GDP. The interval immediately to the right
is (50;50:5]. It contains 8 observations with an average tax level of 5.4% of GDP. The local
averages are represented by a dot. They are a crude estimate for the discontinuity, but they are
a good indicator of the variability of the data.
For parametric estimates of discontinuities at the cuto®, we present Huber-White standard
errors robust to both heteroskedasticity and clustering by state. For the nonparametric results,
allowing for a third degree polynomial or higher. These results are available on request.










where K(:) is the kernel function and h the bandwidth. Let s =
xi¡x
h , the triangular Kernel is de¯ned as:
K = (1 ¡ jsj); for s · 1 and 0 otherwise:
25A bandwidth of 7 implies that the point immediately to the left of the cuto® is estimated with data in the
interval (43, 50], and that the point immediately to the right is estimated with data in the interval (50, 57].
Within these two intervals there are 438 observations, making up 26% of the sample. Out of the 36 states with
line item veto, 26 are present. With the exception of four states, all appear on both sides of the discontinuity.
With the exception of 5 states, all contain observations with Governors from both parties.We have experimented
with other bandwidths and the results do not change much with bandwidths 3-15. Some of these results can be
seen in Section 6.7, Table 10.
10the heteroskedastic robust standard errors are calculated with standard least squares methods,
as noted in Imbems and Lemieux (2008). The variance of the estimated jump is the sum of
the variance of the two point estimates at the cuto®, with one using data to the left of the
cuto® and the other using data to the right. To estimate cluster robust standard errors for the
nonparametric estimate we use the wild cluster bootstrap. It does not require the residuals to
be i.i.d., nor does it require each cluster to have the same size26. Cameron et al. (2008) use
Montecarlo simulations to show that the wild cluster bootstrap works well, particularly when
the number of clusters is small. As is shown in our results, the theoretical cluster robust standard
errors in the parametric estimates are similar to those estimated by the wild bootstrap procedure
with a local linear regression.
6 Regression Discontinuity Estimates
6.1 States with line item veto
Our main results are summarized in Figures 1a, 1b, and Table 1. We estimate a statistically sig-
ni¯cant jump in the tax level around the cuto® point, Governor's strength=50%. The parametric
quartic speci¯cation and the local linear regression with a bandwidth of 7 yield very similar re-
sults: a discontinuity of around 0.67. This is signi¯cant at the 10% level with standard errors
robust to clustering by state. The local linear regression with a bandwidth of 15, yields a smaller
estimate of the discontinuity: 0.39. This is signi¯cant at the 1% level with heteroskedasticity
robust standard errors, and is close to signi¯cance at the 10% level when allowing for clustering
by state. An estimate of 0.67 implies an increase in the average tax level from 5% to 5:67% of
GDP, a 13% percent increase.
In Figure 1a, we can see that most of the variability in local averages (indicated by dots) lies
within the graph's extremities, speci¯cally in regions where Governors's strength is either very
high or very low. The extremities are also the areas with the lowest density, as 55% of the data
lies within the interval [35, 65].
In Figure 1b, we focus on the data surrounding the discontinuity. One can see the statistical
strength of the estimated discontinuity: the parametric and nonparametric estimates to the left
of the cut o® point lie below all the local averages to its right (50, 65], with one exception. The
outlier local average at the 55% mark is due to two observations: Ohio in 1965 with a tax level
of 2.8%, and Ohio in 1966 with a tax level of 2.8%. Similarly the estimate to the right of the
cuto® is higher than most of the local averages to the left, with the exception a few that are far
from the discontinuity.
6.1.1 Robustness checks
Regression discontinuity design and local linear regression estimates are particularly sensitive to
outliers such as Ohio in 1965 and 1966. As mentioned in Section 4, the average tax level in our
sample was much lower in the 1960's than in any other decade. The estimated discontinuity
could have been driven by a few observations to the left of the cuto® from the 1960's. In order
to eliminate any doubt, the ¯rst robustness check we implemented was to exclude the 1960's.
We then continued excluding one decade at a time. As we can show in the Appendix : Section
A.1, Table 11, the result is robust to each exclusion.




















5 . We resample
the residuals 10,000 times for each regression. For more on the wild bootstrap, see Horowitz (2001).
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Figure 1a: State tax level and Governor’s strength
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Figure 1b: State tax level and Governor’s strength (detail Figure 1a)









12Table 1: State tax level and Governor's strength
Method Jump at 50% Robust-SE Bootstp mean Cluster Robust-SE
4-degree polynomials 0.69 (0.21)*** - (0.35)*
LLR(bandwidth 7) 0.66 (0.23)*** 0.60 (0.36)*
LLR(bandwidth 15) 0.39 (0.15)*** 0.35 (0.22)
Note: This sample is comprised of 1712 observations of states with line item veto from 1960 to
2006. Each observation represents a state within a year. The dependent variable is the total sum
of a state's income, sales, and corporate taxes divided by state GDP and shown as a percentage.
The forcing variable is Governor's strength, which is the percentage of seats in the state House of
Representatives that belong to the same party as the Governor. The discontinuity is estimated at
Governor's strength=50%. The ¯rst row shows the results for a four-degree polynomial on each
side of the cuto®. Theoretical heteroskedastic and cluster robust standard errors by state are in
parenthesis. The last two rows show the results for a local linear regression speci¯cation with a
triangular kernel and di®erent bandwidths. Theoretical heteroskedastic robust standard errors are
provided together with bootstrapped cluster robust standard errors (wild bootstrap with 10,000
draws each).
Our result could also have been driven by a particular state. To accomodate this, we also
perform a robustness check excluding one state at a time. The discontinuity in the tax level
remains signi¯cant and point estimates vary marginally. This is in-keeping with our main result,
as can be seen in the Appendix: Section A.2, Table 12.
Since our estimation methods assume the existence of a cuto® point at 50% and estimate
independent regressions on either side, it could be that our estimation methods (see Section
5.2) would show a signi¯cant discontinuity by construction. To check for this, we ran another
robustness check looking for discontinuities at cuto® points at which we expect there to be
no discontinuity, i.e. Governor's strength=f45,46,47,48,49,51,52,53,54,55g. Even though these
estimates are occasionally positive, none are statistically signi¯cant. See the Appendix: Section
A.3, Table 14.
We also checked to see if our Table 1 results hold when using an alternative measure for
the tax level. We use state tax revenues per capita in 1982-dollars. As in the case with taxes
over GDP in Table 1, the estimated discontinuity is signi¯cant with heteroskedasticity robust
standard errors for both the polynomial speci¯cation and the local linear regression. But when
using cluster robust standard errors, we ¯nd that only the local linear regression with bandwidth
7 is signi¯cant. As can be seen in the Appendix: Section A.4, Table 15, depending on the
speci¯cation the point estimates of the discontinuity vary from 62 to 142 dollars per capita. To
the left of the cuto®, the average tax revenue per capita is around 700 dollars, implying a varying
increase in the average tax level from 9% to 20%. This is in-keeping with our estimates of an
increase of 13% in the tax level when using taxes over GDP as our dependent variable.
In order to conclude that this discontinuous jump in the tax level is caused by the switch
from a divided to an aligned government, the relationship between Governor's strength and all
other covariates around the cuto® point must be continuous. The identifying assumption is that
the relationship between Governor's strength and the unobservable variables are also continuous
around the cuto® point. Our next step is to check for discontinuities in the covariates. We do
this in Sections 6.3.2 to Section 6.7.
136.2 States with block veto
In this section, we present our result that there is no discontinuity in the tax level in states with
block veto.
One way to think of observations with block veto is as a control group, in which a treatment
is applied. Due to the characteristics described in Section 3, however, we expect to ¯nd that the
treatment will have no e®ect on the tax level. One problem with this interpretation is that we
only have 292 observations for the states with block veto, unlike the states with line item veto,
for which we have 1712 observations. Nevertheless, we apply the same estimation procedures to
the observations with block veto. The results can be seen in Figure 2 and Table 2. These results
are consistent with our model's prediction that there is no statistically signi¯cant discontinuity
in the tax level in states with block veto27.
Governor’s strength - Seats held in the House by the Governor’s party (%)


























Figure 2: State tax level and Governor’s strength in states with block veto








6.3 Political parties and taxes
6.3.1 Partisan identity of the majority in the state's House of Representatives
In this section, we present our result that when we use the Democrat's seat share in the state's
House of Representative as the forcing variable there is no discontinuity in the tax level in states
with line item veto.
One of the main concerns for the validity of our research design is a conceptual one. An
alternative partisan story could, a priori, be more appropriate to the data than the model we
propose in Section 3. For example, one could conceive a model in which Democratic control of
the Legislature leads to a higher tax level.
27The number of states in this sample (9) is too small to meaningfully estimate the variance-covariance matrix
that allows for clustering by state. For example, in the parametric estimate, the number of clusters is the same
as the number of covariates.
14Table 2: State tax level and Governor's strength in states with block veto
Method Jump at 50% Robust-SE
4-degree polynomials -0.34 (0.28)
LLR(bandwidth 7) -0.21 (0.19)
LLR(bandwidth 15) 0.05 (0.17)
LLR(bandwidth 11) -0.06 (0.17)
Note: This sample is comprised of 292 observations of states with block veto. IN, NC, NH, NV,
and VT have block veto throughout the sample, 1960 to 2006. IA, WA, and WV switched from
block veto to line item veto in 1969; ME switched in 1995. The dependent variable is the total sum
of a state's income, sales, and corporate taxes divided by state GDP and shown as a percentage.
The forcing variable is Governor's strength, which is the percentage of seats in the state House of
Representatives that belong to the same party as the Governor. The discontinuity is estimated at
Governor's strength=50%. The ¯rst row shows the results for a four-degree polynomial on each side
of the cuto®. Theoretical heteroskedastic robust standard errors are in parenthesis. The last three
rows show the results for a local linear regression speci¯cation with a triangular kernel and di®erent
bandwidths. Theoretical heteroskedastic robust standard errors are provided.
To investigate this point further, we use an alternative forcing variable: the percentage of
seats controlled by the Democratic party in the state House. The results of this investigation
can be seen in Table 3 and Figure 3. In the y-axis, we have the state tax level. For comparative
purposes, we have kept the scale the same as in Figure 1b. As the percentage of seats held by
the Democrats moves from the left to the right of the 50% cuto® point, the Democrats gain
control both over the budget and the tax level. If the partisan model held, we would expect a
discontinuous jump at the cuto®. The result of our estimation shows no signi¯cant discontinuity.
We do observe a positive correlation between Democratic control and a higher tax level.
One possibility is to interpret this correlation as being caused by an unobservable variable,
such as the preference of the electorate for a certain tax level. An electorate which prefers a
higher tax level may be also more inclined to vote Democrat. This would imply that as the
percentage of the electorate that prefers a higher tax level increases, so does the percentage of
seats the Democrats hold in the state House. However, around the discontinuity, the electorate's
preferences are assumed to be the same on both sides of the cuto®. The only variable that
changes around the cuto® is the identity of the party holding the majority of the seats in the
state House. As we ¯nd no discontinuity in the tax level, this result suggests that regardless
of which party holds the majority, the resulting tax level is the same. This result is similar
to the one that Ferreira and Gyourko (2009) ¯nd within American cities. They use regression
discontinuity design to show that in American cities partisan identity has no e®ect on ¯scal
policy.
On the other hand, Reed (2006) uses a ¯xed-e®ect strategy and regresses ¯ve-year changes in
the tax level on state characteristics, and on other variables indicating political control. He ¯nds
that Democratic control over the Legislature, measured as the percentage of the ¯ve year period
in which Democrats controlled both state chambers, has a positive impact on the tax level28.
Contrary to Reed (2006), the evidence reported here suggests that, at least when looking
at slim majorities, the driving force for the change in tax level is the relationship between the
Legislature and the Governor, i.e. are aligned or divided, and not the political identity of the
Legislature.
28 This result is similar to that of Pettersson-Lidbom (2008). He looks at Swedish local authorities and ¯nds
with a regression discontinuity design that left wing parties have an e®ect on ¯scal policy.
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Figure 3: State tax level and Democratic control









Table 3: State tax level and Democratic control
Method Jump at 50% Robust-SE Bootstp mean Cluster Robust-SE
4-degree polynomials 0.15 (0.22) - (0.34)
LLR(bandwidth 7) 0.11 (0.23) 0.00 (0.30)
LLR(bandwidth 15) -0.07 (0.15) -0.05 (0.26)
LLR(bandwidth 13) -0.07 (0.17) -0.08 (0.24)
Note: This sample is comprised of 1712 observations of states with line item veto from 1960 to
2006. Each observation represents a state within a year. The dependent variable is the total sum
of a state's income, sales, and corporate taxes divided by state GDP and shown as a percentage.
The forcing variable is Democratic control, the percentage of seats in the state House of Representa-
tives that belongs to the Democracts. The discontinuity is estimated at Governor's strength=50%.
The ¯rst row shows the results for a four-degree polynomial on each side of the cuto®. Theoretical
heteroskedastic and cluster robust standard errors by state are in parenthesis. The last three rows
show the results for a local linear regression speci¯cation with a triangular kernel and di®erent band-
widths. Theoretical heteroskedastic robust standard errors are provided together with bootstrapped
cluster robust standard errors (wild bootstrap with 10,000 draws each).
166.3.2 The Governor's political party
In this section we begin to test our main result, described in Section 6.1, by examining whether
our forcing variable, Governor's strength, is associated with discontinuities in other covariates at
the same 50% cuto® point.
In the ¯rst test, we treat the partisan identity of the Governor as a covariate. The results
can be seen in Table 4 and Figure 4. In the y-axis we have an indicator variable taking value 1 if
the Governor is a Democrat and 0 if the Governor is a Republican. We estimate a discontinuity,
albeit not signi¯cant when allowing for clustering by state. The result indicates that divided
governments, i.e. those to the left of the cuto®, are equally likely to have a Democratic or
Republican Governor. The estimated value for the indicator variable to the left of the cuto® is
0.5. On the right side of the discontinuity, the point estimate is 0.35. This suggests that aligned
governments are more likely Republican.
Counter to common beliefs and the causal interpretation of our main result, this result could
indicate that aligned Republican governments deliver a higher tax rate than Democratic gov-
ernments. But we must stress that this result is not signi¯cant when we allow for clustering by
state in the error term. Moreover, the local average to the immediate right of the discontinuity
is higher than the local average to its immediate left. This suggests, contrary to the direction of
the estimation results, that close to the discontinuity, aligned governments are more likely to be
Democratic. Overall, we do not regard the estimation results in Table 4 and Figure 5 as strong
indicators of a discontinuity.
Governor’s strength - Seats held in the House by the Governor’s party (%)


















































Figure 4: Governor’s political party












17Table 4: Governor's political party and Governor's strength
Method Jump at 50% Robust-SE Bootstp mean Cluster Robust-SE
4-degree polynomials -0.21 (0.10)** - (0.14)
LLR(bandwidth 7) -0.18 (0.11)* -0.16 (0.14)
LLR(bandwidth 15) -0.14 (0.07)** -0.12 (0.09)
LLR(bandwidth 14) -0.14 (0.07)** -0.12 (0.09)
Note: This sample is comprised of 1712 observations of states with line item veto from 1960 to
2006. Each observation represents a state within a year. The dependent variable takes value 1 if the
Governor is a Democrat and 0 if Republican. We have excluded 18 observations with independent
Governors. The forcing variable is Governor's strength, which is the percentage of seats in the
state House of Representatives that belong to the same party as the Governor. The discontinuity is
estimated at Governor's strength=50%. The ¯rst row shows the results for a four-degree polynomial
on each side of the cuto®. Theoretical heteroskedastic and cluster robust standard errors by state
are in parenthesis. The last two rows show the results for a local linear regression speci¯cation with
a triangular kernel and di®erent bandwidths. Theoretical heteroskedastic robust standard errors
are provided together with bootstrapped cluster robust standard errors (wild bootstrap with 10,000
draws each).
6.3.3 Control of the state Senate
In decisions regarding the budget and the tax level, the state Senate's role is equally important
as that of the state House. The organization of the Senate, however, is di®erent to that of the
House. There are fewer senators (an average of 44) than House representatives (an average of
110), and senators have four-year mandates. In a typical election year, usually only half of the
Senate's seats are up for election. In order to describe a slim majority as a random event, one of
the assumptions needed is that a few individual seats in the race are close elections themselves
(see Section 5.1). The small number of election in the average state Senate race makes it easy
for this assumption to be violated. Because of this, the use of a regression discontinuity design
to study the e®ect of the political control over the Senate on the tax level may be inappropriate.
Consequently we do not look for a discontinuity in the relationship between the tax level and
the degree of alignment between the Governor and the Senate.
Instead, we look at the control of the Governor's party over the Senate as another covariate
represented as an indicator variable with value 1 if the Senate majority belongs to the same party
as the Governor, and 0 if otherwise. Had we found a discontinuity in this indicator variable with
the point estimate to the right of the cuto® being higher than the point estimate to the left,
it would have implied that the Senate is more likely to be aligned with the Governor when
the House is also aligned. But as is shown in Figure 5 and Table 5, we ¯nd no discontinuity.
Observations to the left of the cuto® are as likely to have the Senate aligned with the Governor
as those to the right of the cuto®, meaning that the control of the Senate cannot be driving our
main result in Section 6.1.
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Figure 5: Control of Governor’s party over the state Senate












Table 5: Control of Governor's party over the state Senate and Governor's strength
Method Jump at 50% Robust-SE Bootstp mean Cluster Robust-SE
4-degree polynomials -0.05 (0.09) - (0.14)
LLR(bandwidth 7) -0.03 (0.10) -0.01 (0.18)
LLR(bandwidth 15) -0.01 (0.07) 0.05 (0.10)
LLR(bandwidth 10) 0.00 (0.08) 0.00 (0.14)
Note: This sample is comprised of 1712 observations of states with line item veto from 1960 to
2006. Each observation represents a state within a year. The dependent variable takes value 1 if the
Senate is controlled by the Governor's party and value 0 otherwise. The forcing variable is Governor's
strength, which is the percentage of seats in the state House of Representatives that belong to the
same party as the Governor. The discontinuity is estimated at Governor's strength=50%. The
¯rst row shows the results for a four-degree polynomial on each side of the cuto®. Theoretical
heteroskedastic and cluster robust standard errors by state are in parenthesis. The last two rows show
the results for a local linear regression speci¯cation with a triangular kernel and di®erent bandwidths.
Theoretical heteroskedastic robust standard errors are provided together with bootstrapped cluster
robust standard errors (wild bootstrap with 10000 draws each).
196.4 Checking for the manipulation of the forcing variable
6.4.1 Density of the forcing variable
A potential threat to our research design is the possibility that voters may manipulate the
forcing variable (Governor's strength) to such extent that the ¯nal election result is no longer
random. Consider a scenario where voters both prefer and are able to deliberately select a divided
government, even during elections that seem close. In this case, we would expect there to be more
observations to the left of the cuto® than to the right. In order to check for the manipulation of
Governor's strength around the cuto®, we ¯rst look at its density. A discontinuity at the 50%
cuto® could indicate that our forcing variable is being manipulated at the cuto®.
The histogram in Figure 6 indicates the number of observations in intervals of size 2 of the
Governor's strength variable. The density is highest in the interval around the discontinuity, in
fact, 70% of the data is within interval [30,70]. Of particular note in this sample is that there
are the same number of observations in the interval [48, 50) as there are in the interval [50,52).
The lack of a discontinuity in the density suggests that agents are not manipulating the forcing
variable around the cuto® point.
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Figure 6: Histogram of forcing variable











6.5 Checking for discontinuities in other covariates
In Table 6, we show that there are no signi¯cant discontinuities for the following covariates:
turnout at last election, state population, state GDP in 1982-dollars, state unemployment rate,
local property taxes, and in two indicator variables: one for whether an election was midterm
or simultaneous, and one for whether a state has tax and expenditure limitations or not. We
present the results only from our parametric estimations, as the graphical and nonparametric
20estimates produce similar results29.
The fact that we do not ¯nd any discontinuities in variables such as turnout, and on the
indicator variable for midterm elections re-assures us that our forcing variable is not being ma-
nipulated around the cuto® by voters. As Table 6 demonstrates, elections on both sides of the
cuto® are equally as likely to be midterm or simultaneous, and have the same average turnout.
Table 6: Other covariates and Governor's strength - quartic-polynomial speci¯cation
Variable Jump at 50% Robust-SE Cluster Robust-SE
Turnout -0.03 (0.02) (0.03)
Midterm election -0.09 (0.10) (0.11)
Population 0.75 (0.91) (1.67)
Income per capita 0.19 (0.60) (0.84)
Unemployment rate 0.00 (0.37) (0.44)
Local property taxes -0.12 (0.24) (0.37)
Tax and expenditure limitations -0.05 (0.08) (0.13)
Note: This sample is comprised of 1712 observations of states with line item veto from 1960 to
2006. Each observation represents a state within a year. Turnout is de¯ned as the fraction of the
population that turned out to vote in the last election. Midterm election takes value 1 if the election
for that observation was a midterm election, and 0 if if the Governors was also chosen in that election.
Population is the state population in millions for a given year. Income per capita is the state income
per capita in thousands of 1982-dollars. Unemployment rate is the state unemployment rate in a
year. Local property taxes is the percentage of a state average property tax in a year divided by
the state GDP. Tax and expenditure limitations takes value 1 if the state has a tax limitation rule
on that year, and 0 otherwise. The dependent variable takes value 1 the Senate is controlled by
the Governor's party and value 0 otherwise. The forcing variable is Governor's strength, which
is the percentage of seats in the state House of Representatives that belong to the same party
as the Governor. The discontinuity is estimated at Governor's strength=50% with a four-degree
polynomial on each side of the cuto®. Theoretical heteroskedastic and cluster robust standard errors
by state are in parenthesis.
Discontinuities in variables such as population, income per capita, and the unemployment
rate could indicate that observations on both sides of the cuto® are not comparable. If, for
example, states to the right of the cuto® were richer than states to the left, that in itself could
explain the discontinuity in the tax level that we found in Section 6.1, since taxes are progressive.
But because we do not ¯nd any discontinuity in these variables, as can be seen in Table 6, we
are con¯dent that our design has worked well, i.e. the di®erences in these characteristics cannot
be the driving force behind the discontinuity in the tax level.
The states' local property taxes is an interesting covariate to look at, since property taxes are
set by local authorities and not by the state Legislature. Suppose we had found a discontinuity in
the average local property taxes similar to the discontinuity we found in Section 6.1 using state-
wide taxes. Such a result would have been an indication that what is driving the discontinuity
in Section 6.1 is a variable that in°uences all taxes, both local and state wide. And not the
mechanisms we propose in our model in Section 3. As can be seen in Table 6, we ¯nd no
signi¯cant discontinuity in the local property tax.
In the last row of Table 6 we look at an institutional feature that has been adopted by some
of the states in our sample, tax and expenditure limitations. The majority of these limitations
restrict expenditure growth to increases in income per capita or, in some cases, to in°ation
and population growth. Some of these limitations also restrict the size of appropriations to a
29The graphical and nonparametric estimates are available on request.
21percentage of state income; whereas some have statutory bounds on expenditures growth rates30.
Our data has an indicator variable, which takes value 1, should such a rule be in place within a
state during that year and 0 otherwise. If the observations immediately to the left of Governor's
strength=50% had had a higher fraction of state-years with tax and expenditure limitations than
those observations immediately to the right, then this would have raised concerns regarding our
results of a lower tax level to the left of Governor's strength=50% being at least in part driven
by the incidence of tax and expenditure limitations. As shown in Table 6, however, we estimate
no signi¯cant discontinuity.
6.5.1 Supermajority requirement
Another institutional feature we investigate is the supermajority requirement for bills that imply
an increase in tax level31. In principle, when such a requirement is adopted it is no longer enough
to hold 50% of seats to formally raise the tax level, which makes dealing with the observations
that have supermajority requirements more problematic than dealing with other covariates.
One option for dealing with the 240 observations with supermajority requirements would be
to drop them entirely. We explore this alternative in the Appendix: Section B, Table 16. There
you can see that the discontinuity has a slightly higher point estimate than, and the same level
of signi¯cance as, the results in Table 1.
We prefer to keep the observations with supermajority requirements. Firstly, not all super-
majority requirements apply to all forms of taxation. Secondly, a state's tax level may increase
either due to its economic growth or to increased e®orts to counter tax evasion, even without a
formal tax hike. In addition, tax cuts do not require a supermajority.
In Figure 7 and Table 7, we treat the incidence of supermajority requirements as another
covariate and check for a signi¯cant di®erence in the fraction of observations with supermajority
requirements to the left and right of Governor's strength=50%. If we were to ¯nd that this frac-
tion is lower to the right of the cuto®, then this could go some way to explaining the discontinuity
in the tax level. The results in Figure 7 and Table 7 are con°icting.
The parametric quartic speci¯cation indicates a signi¯cant discontinuity, but the nonparamet-
ric local linear regression indicates no discontinuity. Furthermore, the local average measured
at the interval immediately to the left of the discontinuity does not contain any observations
with supermajority requirements. This casts doubt on the parametric estimate at the left of the
discontinuity.
The con°icting results between parametric and non parametric estimation may derive from
a combination of the infrequency of the supermajority indicator variable and the parametric
speci¯cation giving weight to observations far from the cuto® point. We do not consider the
parametric estimates in this case to have enough reliance to a®ect the validity of our results.
30For more details, see Waisanen (2008).
31Supermajority requirements were mostly adopted in the 1990's. Most supermajority requirements include all
taxes, but some are less restrictive, for details see Waisanen (2008).
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Figure 7: Supermajority requirements for a tax increase












Table 7: Supermajority requirements and Governor's strength
Method Jump at 50% Robust-SE Bootstp mean Cluster Robust-SE
4-degree polynomials -0.15 (0.05)*** - (0.09)*
LLR(bandwidth 7) -0.05 (0.04) -0.04 (0.04)
LLR(bandwidth 15) -0.03 (0.04) -0.02 (0.05)
Note: This sample is comprised of 1712 observations of states with line item veto from 1960 to
2006. Each observation represents a state within a year. The dependent variable takes value 1 if
the state has a supermajority requirement for a tax increase (240 observations), and 0 if otherwise.
The forcing variable is Governor's strength, which is the percentage of seats in the state House of
Representatives that belong to the same party as the Governor. The discontinuity is estimated at
Governor's strength=50%. The ¯rst row shows the results for a four-degree polynomial on each
side of the cuto®. Theoretical heteroskedastic and cluster robust standard errors by state are in
parenthesis. The last two rows show the results for a local linear regression speci¯cation with a
triangular kernel and di®erent bandwidths. Theoretical heteroskedastic robust standard errors are
provided together with bootstrapped cluster robust standard errors (wild bootstrap with 10,000
draws each).
236.6 Including covariates
The allocation of treatment in regression discontinuity design is regarded as random. This
makes the identi¯cation of a causal e®ect independent of the inclusion of controls. Consequently,
checking whether our main result is robust to the inclusion of covariates could be an indication
of the validity of our design, as well as being a mechanism through which we can improve the
precision of the estimates.
In Table 8, we separate out the di®erent sets of covariates and also show all these controls
combined in the ¯nal set of four rows. Both the inclusion of covariates and making inference on
the discontinuity is straightforward when using parametric speci¯cations. For the local linear
regression speci¯cations, we estimate a semiparametric procedure in which the covariates enter
linearly, but the forcing variable Governor's strength enters nonparametrically32. We use boot-
strapping to estimate standard errors in the semiparametric setting, continuing to use the wild
cluster bootstrap to estimate cluster robust standard errors. In order to calculate heteroskedastic
robust standard errors, we resample the residuals of the semiparametric model with replacement
10,000 times.
Our main result is robust to the inclusion of covariates, and estimates for the size of the
discontinuity alter little from our original results with no controls in Table 1.
6.7 Lagged tax level
In this section, we treat the lagged tax level as another covariate and look for a discontinuity at
the cuto® on the current Governor's strength. If treatment at each period is assigned completely
at random, then we should observe no discontinuity. Yet Table 9 shows a discontinuity of similar
size and as signi¯cant as the contemporaneous one in Table 1. This result is the main objection
to the validity of our design, as it could imply that the treatment around the discontinuity is not
being assigned completely at random.
The nature of our data itself would make us expect to ¯nd a signi¯cant discontinuity in
the once-lagged tax level regressed on the current Governor's strength. Our forcing variable
Governor's strength changes only every two years, while the tax level varies every year. If we lag
the tax level once, the lagged tax level(t ¡ 1) will be regressed on Governor's strength(t). For
half of the observations, however, Governor's strength(t) is equal to Governor's strength(t ¡ 1),
because Governor's strength only changes every two years. So, for half of our observations we
would still be running a contemporaneous regression. For this reason in Figure 8 and Table 9,
we lag the tax level twice(t ¡ 2), but we still ¯nd a signi¯cant discontinuity.
In principle, we only need to look at observations at the discontinuity. Due to feasibility
constraints however, we must include observations away from the discontinuity as well. As
our observations are far from the cuto®, assignment of treatment is less likely to be random
overtime. Slim majorities of one or two competitive seats are much more likely to be overturned
in an election than majorities of more seats. Once a strong divided government is in place, e.g.
with Governor's Strength=55%, it is probable that it will last for more than two years. Therefore
each observation with a divided government is likely to have had the same status during more
than two preceding periods. Even if we lag the tax level twice, we are still likely to be relating the
twice-lagged tax level to a divided government, albeit one with a di®erent value of Governor's
Strength.
Our conjecture is that if we were able to restrain our estimation to data at the cuto®, then the
estimated discontinuity in the twice-lagged tax level would disappear. This conjecture, however,
is not testable because there is not enough data to estimate the discontinuity with such as small
32For details of the procedure see the Appendix, Section C.
24Table 8: State tax level, Governor's strength, and Controls
Method Jump at 50% Bootstp mean Robust-SE Bootstp mean Cluster Robust-SE
Controls: dummy for Governor's party, dummy for Senate controlled by Governor's party
4-degree polynomials 0.67 - (0.21)** - (0.35)*
LLR(bandwidth 7) 0.63 0.57 (0.25)** 0.59 (0.38)
LLR(bandwidth 15) 0.39 0.36 (0.16)** 0.36 (0.23)
Controls: dummy for midterm election, turnout for last election
4-degree polynomials 0.71 - (0.28)*** - (0.38)*
LLR(bandwidth 7) 0.53 0.52 (0.26)** 0.53 (0.38)
LLR(bandwidth 15) 0.36 0.31 (0.16)* 0.33 (0.23)
Controls: dummy supermajority requirements, dummy for tax limitations
4-degree polynomials 0.69 - (0.21)*** - (0.33)**
LLR(bandwidth 7) 0.67 0.61 (0.26)** 0.61 (0.35)*
LLR(bandwidth 15) 0.40 0.35 (0.18) * 0.35 (0.21)*
Controls: population, income per capita, unemployment
4-degree polynomials 0.71 - (0.19)*** - (0.30)**
LLR(bandwidth 7) 0.70 0.64 (0.23)*** 0.64 (0.31)**
LLR(bandwidth 15) 0.42 0.37 (0.16)** 0.37 (0.19)**
Controls: All of the above
4-degree polynomials 0.62 - (0.18)*** - (0.29)**
LLR(bandwidth 7) 0.61 0.59 (0.24)** 0.59 (0.32)*
LLR(bandwidth 15) 0.38 0.33 (0.15)** 0.34 (0.19)*
Note: This sample is comprised of 1712 observations of states with line item veto from 1960 to
2006. Each observation represents a state within a year. The dependent variable is the total sum
of a state's income, sales, and corporate taxes divided by state GDP and shown as a percentage.
The forcing variable is Governor's strength, which is the percentage of seats in the state House of
Representatives that belong to the same party as the Governor. The discontinuity is estimated at
Governor's strength=50%. For each set of results, di®erent linear controls are used. The ¯rst row
in each set shows the results for a four-degree polynomial on each side of the cuto®. Theoretical
heteroskedastic and cluster robust standard errors by state are in parenthesis. The last two rows
in each set show the results for a local linear regression speci¯cation with a triangular kernel and
di®erent bandwidths. Theoretical heteroskedastic robust standard errors are provided together with
bootstrapped cluster robust standard errors (wild bootstrap with 10,000 draws each).
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Figure 8: State tax level lagged two periods and Governor’s strength









Table 9: Lagged state tax level and Governor's strength
Method Jump at 50% Robust-SE Bootstp mean Cluster Robust-SE
Dep. var. State taxes over GDP lagged once
4-degree polynomials 0.71 (0.21)*** - (0.35)*
LLR(bandwidth 7) 0.64 (0.21)*** 0.59 (0.34)*
LLR(bandwidth 15) 0.44 (0.15)*** 0.40 (0.21)*
Dep. var. State taxes over GDP lagged twice
4-degree polynomials 0.66 (0.21)*** - (0.35)*
LLR(bandwidth 7) 0.55 (0.22)*** 0.52 (0.32)
LLR(bandwidth 15) 0.41 (0.15)*** 0.38 (0.20)*
Note: This sample is comprised of state-years with line item veto from 1960 to 2006. There are
1678 observations for the lagged-once set of regressions and 1644 observations for the lagged-twice
set. The dependent variable is the total sum of a state's income, sales, and corporate taxes divided
by state GDP, lagged once for the ¯rst set of regressions, and lagged twice for the second set.
The forcing variable is Governor's strength, which is the percentage of seats in the state House
of Representatives that belong to the same party as the Governor. The discontinuity is estimated
at Governor's strength=50%. In each set of regressions, the ¯rst row shows the results for a four-
degree polynomial on each side of the cuto®. Theoretical heteroskedastic and cluster robust standard
errors by states are in parenthesis. The last two rows show the results for a local linear regression
speci¯cation with a triangular kernel and with di®erent bandwidths. Theoretical heteroskedastic
robust standard errors are provided together with bootstrapped cluster robust standard errors (wild
bootstrap with 10,000 draws each).
26bandwidth reliably. In Table 10, we show how the estimation of the discontinuity with the current
tax level, and the estimation of the discontinuity with the twice-lagged tax level are sensitive to
restricting the bandwidth to data very close to the cuto®.
We can see in Table 10 that the estimated discontinuity on the the twice-lagged tax level only
becomes signi¯cant when using a bandwidth of 4 or higher, whereas the estimated discontinuity
on the current tax level becomes signi¯cant with a bandwidth of 3 or higher. Moreover, the
estimated discontinuity on the the twice-lagged tax level is never signi¯cant when allowing for
clustering by state in the error term. Whereas the estimated discontinuity on the current tax level
becomes signi¯cant when allowing for clustering by state in the error term with a bandwidth of
4 or higher. We see this comparison as an indication that our conjecture may hold and therefore,
do not see the results in Table 9 and Figure 8 as a threat to the validity of our design33.
Table 10: Tax level and lagged tax level on Governor's strength - di®erent bandwidths
Method Jump at 50% Robust-SE Bootstp mean Cluster Robust-SE
Current tax level on current Governor's strength
LLR(bandwidth 1) 0.76 (0.53) 0.74 (0.68)
LLR(bandwidth 2) 0.71 (0.45) 0.64 (0.53)
LLR(bandwidth 3) 0.61 (0.35)* 0.65 (0.40)
LLR(bandwidth 4) 0.67 (0.30)** 0.68 (0.37)*
LLR(bandwidth 5) 0.69 (0.27)** 0.69 (0.37)*
LLR(bandwidth 6) 0.68 (0.25)*** 0.64 (0.38)*
LLR(bandwidth 7) 0.66 (0.23)*** 0.60 (0.36)*
Tax level lagged twice on current Governor's strength
LLR(bandwidth 1) 0.63 (0.43) 0.57 (0.63)
LLR(bandwidth 2) 0.45 (0.35) 0.41 (0.47)
LLR(bandwidth 3) 0.43 (0.30) 0.47 (0.38)
LLR(bandwidth 4) 0.50 (0.28)* 0.51 (0.35)
LLR(bandwidth 5) 0.52 (0.26)** 0.55 (0.34)
LLR(bandwidth 6) 0.57 (0.23)*** 0.54 (0.33)
LLR(bandwidth 7) 0.55 (0.22)*** 0.52 (0.32)
Note: This sample is comprised of state-years with line item veto from 1960 to 2006. There are
1644 observations for the set of regressions using the tax level lagged twice, and 1712 observations
for the set of regressions using the current tax level. The dependent variable is the total sum of
a state's income, sales, and corporate taxes divided by state GDP, current for the ¯rst set and
twice-lagged for the second set of regressions. The forcing variable is Governor's strength, which is
the percentage of seats in the state House of Representatives that belong to the same party as the
Governor. The discontinuity is estimated at Governor's strength=50%. Each row shows the results
for a local linear regression speci¯cation with a triangular kernel and with di®erent bandwidths.
Theoretical heteroskedastic robust standard errors are provided together with bootstrapped cluster
robust standard errors (wild bootstrap with 10,000 draws each).
33Other papers have looked explicitly at the dynamic nature of similar data, albeit not by using regression
discontinuity design. Alt and Lowry (1994) and Poterba (1994) are interested in how governments respond to
recession driven de¯cits. Their ¯ndings are that uni¯ed governments tend to respond faster and to be more
dependent on tax increases than on expenditure cuts.
277 Concluding remarks
Close elections and slim majorities are good examples of a quasi-random assignment of treatment.
The political economy literature has a lot to gain from using regression discontinuity design. An
example of this is that we found that the partisan identity of the Legislature's majority party does
not seem to have a causal e®ect on the tax level. Instead, it is the alignment between the Governor
and the Legislature's majority, independent of party identity, that drives the discontinuity in the
tax level.
Our model describes the budget in the states that have block veto as a take-it-or-leave-it o®er
made by the Legislature. Since the Governor ¯nds the outside option too costly, the Legislature
can approve whichever budget and whatever tax level it wants, completely independent of the
Governor. In particular, the Legislature uses any increase in tax revenues to target transfers to
its supporters. The Legislature is the residual claimant of a tax increase and therefore, it has
every interest in increasing the tax level.
In states with line item veto, the budget is not a take-it-or-leave-it o®er. Once the budget
has been approved by the Legislature, the Governor can trim the budget and even cut entire
items. The `sting' of the line item veto is to enable the Governor to cut the budget whenever he
deems it appropriate. Having said that, the Governor will only do this, if his interests are not
aligned with those of the Legislature. When the interests are not aligned, the Legislature cannot
use an increase in tax revenues to target transfers to its supporters. The Legislature is not the
residual claimant of a tax increase, and therefore there is no point in increasing the tax level.
The budgetary separation of powers is only e®ective when the agent proposing the tax level (the
Legislature) is not the residual claimant of a tax increase.
Two empirical ¯ndings corroborate our theoretical model. Firstly, in states with line item
veto, we identify a statistically signi¯cant discontinuous rise of 13% in the tax level, when there
is a switch from a divided to an aligned government. Secondly, in states with block veto, we ¯nd
no discontinuity when the government switches from divided to aligned.
We have chosen a static approach for both our modeling and empirical strategy. This approach
facilitates a straightforward adaptation of the regression discontinuity design method to our data.
A next step in this line of research would be to model the time structure within our data set and
allow for path dependence of some of our variables.
In this paper, we have focused on a novel way to look for discontinuities in variables that
relate to political control in states, countries, or other polities with a separation of powers. When
looking for the e®ects of political control on ¯scal or policy variables, our results suggest that
focusing on discontinuous changes in the degree of alignment between powers, such as a switch
from divided to aligned government, could be as important as looking for discontinuous changes
in party control over agenda setting powers. This approach has the potential to shed light on
how the composition of state spending varies, on how transfer from the federal government may




Table 11: Tax level and Governor's strength. Four degree polynomial speci¯cation on each side
of the cuto®, excluding one decade at a time






Note: This sample is comprised of state-years with line item veto from 1960 to 2006. We exclude
one decade at a time. Each regression is run with 1369, 1342, 1342, 1346, and 1449 observations
respectively . The dependent variable is the percentage of the sum of income, sales, and corporate
taxes in a state divided by state GDP and shown as a percentage. The forcing variable is Governor's
strength, the percentage of seats in the state House of Representatives that belong to the same party
as the Governor. The discontinuity is estimated at Governor's strength=50%. Each row shows the
results for a four-degree polynomial on each side of the cuto®. Theoretical cluster robust standard
errors by state are in parenthesis.
29A.2 Excluding one state at a time
Table 12: Tax level and Governor's strength. Four degree polynomial speci¯cation on each side
of the cuto®, excluding one state at a time
Excluded Jump at 50% Cluster robust-SE Excluded Jump at 50% Cluster robust-SE
AL 0.70 (0.35)* AZ 0.71 (0.35)*
CO 0.72 (0.36)* CT 0.74 (0.36)**
DE 0.73 (0.35)** FL 0.67 (0.35)*
GA 0.69 (0.35)* IA 0.65 (0.35)*
IL 0.64 (0.38)* KS 0.71 (0.36)*
KY 0.66 (0.36)* LA 0.66 (0.36)*
MA 0.57 (0.33)* MD 0.70 (0.35)*
MI 0.70 (0.38)* MO 0.65 (0.35)*
MS 0.74 (0.35)** MT 0.68 (0.37)*
ND 0.72 (0.37)* NJ 0.62 (0.35)*
NM 0.65 (0.35)* NY 0.71 (0.36)*
OH 0.71 (0.35)* OK 0.74 (0.35)**
OR 0.68 (0.36)* PA 0.97 (0.33)***
SC 0.71 (0.35)* SD 0.71 (0.36)*
TN 0.72 (0.36)* TX 0.62 (0.34)*
UT 0.69 (0.35)* VA 0.66 (0.35)*
WA 0.71 (0.37)* WI 0.55 (0.31)*
WV 0.66 (0.35)* WY 0.64 (0.36)*
Note: This sample is comprised of state-years with line item veto from 1960 to 2006. Each regression
is run with 1665 observations. The exceptions are: CT with 1669 observations, as Connecticut had
fours years with an independent Governor dropped; IA, WA, WV each with 1674 observations, as
they adopted the line item veto in 1969. The dependent variable is the percentage of the sum of
income, sales, and corporate taxes in a state divided by state GDP and shown as a percentage. The
forcing variable is Governor's strength, the percentage of seats in the state House of Representatives
that belong to the same party as the Governor. The discontinuity is estimated at Governor's
strength=50%. In each entry we exclude from the sample the state in columns 1 or 3. Each row
shows the results for a four-degree polynomial on each side of the cuto®. Theoretical cluster robust
standard errors by state are in parenthesis.
30A.2.1 Including Minnesota
Minnesota is an outlier in many ways. Firstly, until 1972 Minnesota had an o±cially non-partisan
Legislature. We therefore, do not have data on Governor's strength for Minnesota before 1973.
Secondly, from 1982 to 1998, Minnesota's Governors were not the candidates chosen by their
own parties in the primaries. Democrat Rudy Perpich entered and won the race for Governor
in 1981 running directly against the Democratic candidate chosen in the primaries. Republican
Arne Carson lost in all but one of the 87 state-district primaries, but his name was replaced in
the ballot after a scandal forced the chosen Republican candidate to step down, and he became
Governor in 1989 (for a detailed account of contemporary Minnesota political history see Brandl
(2000)). Since our model depends on the alignment of interests between Governor and the
Governor's party in the Legislature, we have decided to treat these Governors as independents
and have excluded them from the data. We did the same with Jesse Ventura, who was the
independent Governor of the State from 1999 to 2002. After all these exclusion we thought best
to drop Minnesota completely.
The third reason why Minnesota is an outlier in our data is that it has the highest average
tax revenue in our sample, i.e. 7.89%, compared to an average across the sample of 5.4%.
Nevertheless we could, in practice, include the data from Minnesota from 1972 to 1998 and
from 2003 to 2006. There are many observations around the cuto® and with such high average
taxes the inclusion of these outliers make our results less stable, as we can see in Table 13.
Table 13: Tax level and Governor's strength-Including Minnesota
Method Jump at 50% Robust-SE Bootstp mean Cluster robust-SE
4-degree polynomials 0.42 (0.23)** - (0.42)
LLR(bandwidth 7) 0.53 (0.25)** 0.43 (0.39)
LLR(bandwidth 15) 0.23 (0.16) 0.22 (0.27)
Note: This sample is comprised of 1741 observations of states with line item veto from 1960 to
2006. Each observation represents a state within a year. The dependent variable is the total sum
of a state's income, sales, and corporate taxes divided by state GDP and shown as a percentage.
The forcing variable is Governor's strength, which is the percentage of seats in the state House of
Representatives that belong to the same party as the Governor. The discontinuity is estimated at
Governor's strength=50%. The ¯rst row shows the results for a four-degree polynomial on each
side of the cuto®. Theoretical heteroskedastic and cluster robust standard errors by state are in
parenthesis. The last two rows show the results for a local linear regression speci¯cation with a
triangular kernel and di®erent bandwidths. Theoretical heteroskedastic robust standard errors are
provided together with bootstrapped cluster robust standard errors (wild bootstrap with 10,000
draws each).
31A.3 Uniqueness of discontinuity
Table 14: Tax level and Governor's strength - quartic-polynomial speci¯cation, alternative cuto®
points
Cuto® point Jump Robust-SE Cluster robust-SE
45% 0.29 (0.76) (1.22)
46% 0.36 (0.68) (0.81)
47% 0.27 (0.44) (0.66)
48% 0.00 (0.30) (0.37)
49% 0.35 (0.25) (0.36)
50% 0.69 (0.21)*** (0.35)*
51% 0.35 (0.22) (0.42)
52% 0.36 (0.27) (0.34)
53% 0.27 (0.30) (0.51)
54% 0.34 (0.44) (0.80)
55% 0.66 (0.54) (0.96)
Note: This sample is comprised of 1712 observations of states with line item veto from 1960 to
2006. Each observation represents a state within a year. The dependent variable is the percentage
of the sum of income, sales, and corporate taxes in a state divided by state GDP and shown as
a percentage. The forcing variable is Governor's strength, the percentage of seats in the state
House of Representatives that belong to the same party as the Governor. The discontinuity is
estimated at di®erent cuto® values of Governor's strength. Each row shows the results for a four-
degree polynomial on each side of the cuto®. Theoretical heteroskedastic robust and cluster robust
standard errors by state are in parenthesis.
A.4 Alternative measure: state taxes per capita
Table 15: Taxes per capita and Governor's strength
Method Jump at 50% Robust-SE Bootstp mean Cluster robust-SE
4-degree polynomials 92.2 (46.3)** - (69.7)
LLR(bandwidth 7) 143.8 (50.8)*** 116.4 (64.1)*
LLR(bandwidth 15) 61.2 (33.8)* 58.7 (43.5)
LLR(bandwidth 16) 62.2 (32.7)* 59.6 (42.3)
Note: This sample is comprised of 1712 observations of states with line item veto from 1960 to 2006.
Each observation represents a state within a year. The dependent variable is the total sum of a state's
income, sales, and corporate taxes per capita in 1982-dollars. The forcing variable is Governor's
strength, which is the percentage of seats in the state House of Representatives that belong to the
same party as the Governor. The discontinuity is estimated at Governor's strength=50%. The
¯rst row shows the results for a four-degree polynomial on each side of the cuto®. Theoretical
heteroskedastic and cluster robust standard errors by state are in parenthesis. The last two rows show
the results for a local linear regression speci¯cation with a triangular kernel and di®erent bandwidths.
Theoretical heteroskedastic robust standard errors are provided together with bootstrapped cluster
robust standard errors (wild bootstrap with 10,000 draws each).
32B Excluding observations with supermajority requirements
Table 16: Tax level and Governor's strength- observations with supermajority requirement ex-
cluded
Method Jump at 50% Robust-SE Bootstp mean Cluster Robust-SE
4-degree polynomials 0.81 (0.23)*** - (0.40)**
LLR(bandwidth 7) 0.74 (0.24)*** 0.65 (0.39)*
LLR(bandwidth 15) 0.43 (0.16)*** 0.37 (0.24)
Note: This sample is comprised of 1472 observations of states with line item veto from 1960 to 2006.
Each observation represents a state within a year. We have excluded the observations with superma-
jority requirements for a tax increase. The dependent variable is the total sum of a state's income,
sales, and corporate taxes divided by the state GDP as a percentage for that year. The forcing
variable is Governor's strength, which is the percentage of seats in the state House of Representa-
tives that belong to the same party as the Governor. The discontinuity is estimated at Governor's
strength=50%. The ¯rst row shows the results for a four-degree polynomial on each side of the
cuto®. Theoretical heteroskedastic and cluster robust standard errors by state are in parenthesis.
The last two rows show the results for a local linear regression speci¯cation with a triangular kernel
and di®erent bandwidths. Theoretical heteroskedastic robust standard errors are provided together
with bootstrapped cluster robust standard errors (wild bootstrap with 10,000 draws each).
C Semiparametric procedure
We implement a semiparametric estimation similar to that presented Robinson (1988)34. In
this procedure he proposes, one of the covariates enters the model nonlinearly. The model is
estimated without the need of making parametric assumptions on the shape of the nonlinear
relation. We reproduce his procedure with the exception that we allow for a discontinuity at the
cuto® at the stage in which the the function is estimated nonparametrically.
The model we are estimating is:
tax levelst = X0¯ + f(gst) + ²st;
where X is the matrix with the covariates. The function f(gst) is the non-linear part of the
model, and g =Governor's strength.
The ¯rst step is to estimate the correlation between g and all the other variables. We estimate
each correlation non parametrically with a local linear regression.
The ¯s are estimated by the following OLS regression:





where each column of the matrix X is the ¯tted errors of the local linear regression of each
column of X on g. The vector ¿ is the ¯tted errors of a local linear regression of tax level on g.
Once we have the ^ ¯s we retrieve the ¯tted errors:
tax level = ttax GDPp ¡ X0^ ¯:
The shape of f(g) is identi¯ed by running another local linear regression of tax level on Gov-
ernor's strength. But since we are allowing for a discontinuity, we estimate one for Governor's
strength· 0:5, and one for Governor's strength> 0:5.
34For a summary of the procedure and applications, see also Ichimura and Todd (2006).
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